the fkfmun 'ttace offensive"
Despite the recently headlined Kremlin "peace offensive, continued Soviet-Communist Dreosureo and expansion In various parts of tlte world Indicate tint any "softening" by the Soviet Union should be retarded onlyemporary tactical adjustment and netreludeweeping revision of Soviet policy toward the west. The USSR apparently now intends to exploitefusal to engage in bilateral negotiations on Germanyurther exanrMe of vz insincerity in the quest for world peace.
"Western rurope roviet pressure continues unabated In
westernrance, theGeneral Confederation of Labor, which called the still unsettled coal strike and which is campaigning for rotation strikes In other Industries, admitted publicly that groups of miners In the USSR and its Satellites werefunds to finance Idlehe western zones of Germany, the Communists are organizing youth and factory colls in preparation for Increased agitation, mSoviet occupation authorities recently sought to counteract slowly Improving economic conditions by demanding anotherof locomotive* and rolling stock aa war booty. This action, combined with recent Coviet success io intimidating Austrian officials byumber of vustrian citizens, may lead Austria to waver In ita cooperation wtth thepowers.
Near East The return of Soviet Embassador Sadchlkov to
Tehran mayenewed camoatgn against the US arms urogram and US military missions in Iran. The latest incident In the Soviet "war of nerves" is the occupation by the USSRtrip of territory claimed by Iran and located along the Soviet border east of the Caspian Sea. Soviet prossure
"PEACE OFFENSIVE"
vill probably Ue restricted to demands for an oil concession in Inn and repeated charges Out US military aid violates1 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Frtenofchip.
Jamn art erf expanding operations in the Fox Eaat, the ussf has Increased Its activity and Interest bt Japanese affairs. Mcdotov'c recent reiteration ol Kremlin interest in the early conclusionapanese pence treaty may be th* beginningrcipaganda campaign designed to harass US occupation authorities, in late September, the USSR again requested that "those powers most interested' be authorized by the Far Eastern Commission to exercise international controls over Japanese Industry which would extend beyond those establishedormal neace treaty. The Soviet member of the Mllod Council for Japan has also been sharply critical of both the Japanese Government and SCAP during the past three months. fts one measure of Soviet Intent tn the Tar East, radio transmitting facilities of several Siberian broadcasting stations beaming propaganda to Japan havo boon strengthened so tbat virtually any standard jaoaneBe radio set can pick up the signal.
China propaganda announcements by prominent
Chinese Communists suggest that the USSH isthe way for mora active participation In Chinese affairs. In the most recent announcement, Liu Shao-cht, member of the Chinese Communist Central Committee, attemptedadio commentary to prove that Chineso oatrlotlnm was not Incompatible with "proletarianAlthough the philosophical subtletiesi's reasoning will largely escape the rank and file of Chinese Communists, this public acknowledgment of Soviet primacy in the conduct of local Communist Party affairs probably represents the beginningovietducational" campaign to prepare the Chineseominating role oy the USSR in China.
UNITED NATIONS
Berlin Dispute The Lie-Evatt appeal (or the resumption of
four-power talks on Berlin, despite Its apparent conciliatory attitude toward the USSR, was designed primarily to focus attention once more on the gravity of the Berlin deadlock and thus set the stageew compromise proposal by the SC neutrals. If the neutrals caneady-made currency plan to be put into effect simultaneously with the lifting of the blockade, the USSR will be unable to base Its objections, as It did in the first proposal of the neutral nations, on the lack ofy depriving the USSR of this technical excuse for blocking settlement ot the Berlin problem,roposal will somewhat Improve chances for four-power agreement. On the other hand. If the USSR should veto any new proposal which provided for adequate four-power control of the Berlin currency.the Kremlin's real Intentions in Berlin would be unmasked.
Korean Case The UN General Assembly will now probably recognise the Rhee regime In South Korea as the national Korean government. Small-power opposition to Soviet tactics Is stiffening and the USSR has little chance of gainingrecognition of the Communist government in North Korea. Rather thanossible Soviet compromise proposal for federation of the northern and southern regimes, the GA is likely to order the returnN commission to Korea charged with responsibility forormula for the incorporation of North Korea into the UN-recognlzed national government.ommission would also acteterrent to Communist violence. UN handling of the Korean problem may be further complicated by Sovietexploitationrobable request by the South Korean Governmentriendly power for retention of US occupation troops until the South Korean military establishment Is capable of withstanding Communist pressures from the north orommunist China.
Original document.
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